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WHAT CAUSES NEW SECURITIES
REGULATION? 300 YEARS OF EVIDENCE
STUART BANNER*
Computers are just the latest in a long series of technological
innovations that have reduced the cost and increased the speed of
transmitting information. At each previous step in the process, speculators
have been very quick to take advantage of whatever was at the cutting
edge of information technology. In the early 18th century, agents of
speculators would race back to England with news of foreign wars, to be
the first to use that information to buy or sell government debt.' In the
winter of 1791-92, only a year or so after regular securities trading began
in the United States, three express stagecoaches were running daily
between New York and Philadelphia, and speculators were sending agents
back and forth to arbitrage between prices in the two cities.2 Securities
traders were among the earliest to use the new inventions of the 19th
century, first the telegraph and then the telephone.3 There are few areas of
life, if any, where knowledge translates so directly into money as it does in
the stock market. Whenever technological change has made information
cheaper or faster to receive, speculators have been eager purchasers. In
this respect, computers are nothing new.
Previous developments in information technology have not led to new
securities regulation. There was a great deal of securities regulation in the
19th-century United States, but there were no bursts of new regulation that
can plausibly be traced to the invention of the telegraph or the telephone.
In earlier times, the development of faster stagecoach lines and faster ships
was not followed by any new regulation.
Securities markets have existed in England and the United States for
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over three hundred years, and they have been regulated by governments all
the while. Information, meanwhile, has been growing cheaper and faster,
often in bursts similar to the recent spread of computers. There has not
been much of a relationship between the two developments. Unless there
is something about computers that sets them apart from previous instances
of technological change, this experience supports the prediction of Paul
Mahoney4 and many of the other participants at this conference that the
new technology of the late 20th century will have little effect on the
regulatory framework for securities trading.
If new technology doesn't cause new securities regulation, what does?
In a nutshell, crashes. All of the 18th-century English regulation, and even
all of the 18th-century proposed regulation, came immediately after
sustained price declines.' The first significant American securities
regulation, passed in 1792 in New York, followed the big crash of that
year.' And of course the federal securities acts of the early 1930s came
soon after the crash of 1929. This is just a general trend, not an absolute
rule. There have been sharp price declines without subsequent regulation,
and of course there has been regulation without immediately preceding
price declines. But most of the major instances of new securities regulation
in the past three hundred years of English and American history have
come right after crashes.
To understand why this is so, one needs to consider the history of
popular thought concerning securities markets. As long as securities have
been traded, Anglo-American popular culture has contained a few strands
of thought suspicious of trading and hostile to speculators. The securities
market has been widely thought to involve more deceit than markets in
other items, because securities have been consistently perceived to be
more susceptible to price manipulation than anything previously known.
The political power of speculators-their incentive and perceived ability
to nudge public policy in the direction that will push securities prices up or
down-has been a constant source of public concern. The belief that
securities trading is a nonproductive sphere of the economy, one that
4. Paul G. Mahoney, Technology, Property Rights in Information, and Securities Regulation, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 815 (1997).
5. Prices dropped in 1720, 1733-34, 1746-48, 1753-56, 1758-62, and the early 1770s. PHILIP
MIROWSKI, THE BIRTH OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE 235-38, 243, 247-48 (1985). Parliament considered
new regulation in the early 1720s, 1733-34, 1746, 1756, 1771, and 1773.
6. N.Y. Laws, 15th Sess., ch. 62 (1792).
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drains resources from more fruitful activities, has been ever present. These
strands of thought were pervasive in England in the 1690s, and they are
still pervasive in the United States today. Lynn Stout's paper at this
conference is a particularly well-stated example of the last point.7 Ever
since securities markets were invented, they have come under constant
criticism for these reasons.
As long as the market has been rising or at least holding steady,
however, these strands of thought have been kept in check by the simple
fact that too many people have been making too much money to favor
regulation restricting trading. But when prices drop, much of that
opposition to regulation is removed. People who were proponents of
securities trading in good times become critics in bad. The result, more
often than not, is that new legislation gets introduced, and often that
legislation gets passed. New securities regulation thus tends to follow
crashes.
Lynn's paper demonstrates the persistence of some of these strands of
thought, even when surrounding circumstances have forced changes in the
precise arguments capable of being made by critics of speculation. From
the beginning, many people argued, just as Lynn argues, that securities
trading was harmful because it was a zero-sum game, in which repeat
players could make consistent gains at the expense of wave after wave of
neophytes. As Jonathan Swift saw the market in 1721,
One fool may from another win,
And then get off with money stored;
But if a sharper once comes in,
He throws at all, and sweeps the board.8
Thomas Gordon made a similar point a few years later, using the
standard pejorative term for securities trading, "stock-jobbing," a word
whose gradual disappearance from standard usage in the 19th century
signalled an equally gradual transformation in the status of the stock
market in popular consciousness. "[T]he Practice of Stock-jobbing,"
Gordon argued, consists of trying "to gratify the immoderate and
insatiable Desires of some covetous and ambitious Persons, at the Expence
7. Lynn A. Stout, Technology, Transactions Costs, ans Investor Welfare: Is a Motley Fool Born
Every Minute?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 791 (1997).
8. Jonathan Swift, Upon the South Sea Project (1721), in JONATHAN SWIFT: THE COMPLETE
POEMS 209-10 (Pat Rogers ed., 1983).
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of lessening the Substance, and procuring the irreparable Loss and
Calamity of others."9
This zero-sum redistribution of wealth was considered bad for three
reasons. First, the losers were understood to be honest investors, while the
winners were perceived as slightly shady characters. The redistribution
thus had moral implications. That moral shading is still present to some
degree in the popular conception of the stock market.
Second, the zero-sum nature of securities trading made it look very
much like gambling, which of course already had a long history of being
criticized largely for the same reason. "Stock-jobbing, properly speaking,
is only another word for Gaming," suggested Daniel Defoe, one of the
prominent early proponents of regulation.'0 A play about stock
speculators, performed in London in 1720, contained the following verse:
Some rise, and some fall,
The Devil and all,
All Fools here their fortunes to try,
The Prospect is gain,
They ne'er can attain,
Like Gamesters at Hazard and Dy."
Third, people complained about what we would today call the
opportunity costs of speculation. This zero-sum enterprise was absorbing a
great deal of labor and capital, resources that could be more profitably
used for productive purposes. In 1697, when the market was only a few
years old, one critic already claimed that it was "to the Discouragement of
the Trade of this Kingdom," because it diverted "the [money] and Time of
the Traders, whose Heads and Tongues being busied how to Outwit and
Circumvent one another, are not at leisure to mind and follow their proper
Trades and Callings."' 2 Every unit of labor expended in the stock market
was one less unit left for the productive parts of the economy, as one poet
lamented in 1720, the year of the South Sea Bubble.
9. THOMAS GORDON, AN ESSAY ON THE PRACTICE OF STOCK-JOBBING 2 (London, J. Peele
1724).
10. DANIEL DEFOE, THE GAMESTER: A BENEFIT-TCKET FOR ALL THAT ARE CONCERN'D IN THE
LOTTERIES 12 (London, J. Roberts 1719).
11. EXCHANGE-ALLEY: OR, THE STOCK-JOBBER TURN'D GENTLEMAN; WITH THE HUMOURS OF
OUR MODERN PROJECTORS 26 (London, T. Bickerton 1720).




CAUSES OF SECURITIES REGULATION
But now th' old-fashion'd Ways are laid aside,
And Men Post-haste to Wealth and Honour ride.
Who to the Waves would ev'r intrust his Store,
Or weltring lie in his own reeking Gore?
Who flatter Courtiers? Who at Bar would plead?
Torture a text, or sow the Teeming Seed?
When one small Venture in the South-Sea Stocks,
Exceeds the wealthiest Farmer's choicest Flocks[?] 13
In the 18th century, people didn't yet speak of "transaction costs," but
their overall point was the same as the point Lynn is making. 4 Securities
speculation added nothing to the national wealth-it was a zero-sum
game-but it entailed costs, and so in the aggregate it was harmful.
This way of thinking crossed the Atlantic, and reappeared in the United
States when the first American securities markets began operating in the
1790s. "Ships are lying idle in the wharfs," Thomas Jefferson complained
in 1791, "buildings are stopped, capitals withdrawn from commerce,
manufactures, arts, and agricultures, to be employed in gambling" in
stocks. 5 The same year, an anonymous New York poet observed:
The humble arts are fairly now contemn'd,
And honest Commerce in derision's nam'd;
'Tis found a far more profitable job
To pilfer private men-the public rob.' 6
From the beginning of securities trading in the United States over two
hundred years ago, many people shared Lynn's concern that speculation
was wasteful.
Lynn differs from her predecessors, however, in that she is working
within a very different intellectual climate. Eighteenth-century critics
inhabited a culture in which it was widely believed that all internal trade
was a zero-sum game. 7 As a resident of colonial Massachusetts put it,
13. J.B., A POEM OCCASION'D BY THE RISE AND FALL OF SOUTH-SEA STOCK 11 (London,
Samuel Chapman & John Williams 1720).
14. Stout, supra note 7, at 797.
15. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Rutledge (Aug. 25, 1791), in 25 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 74 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950-).
16. THE GLASS; OR, SPECULATION: A POEM 4 (New York 1791)
17. J.E. CROWLEY, THIS SHEBA, SELF: THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ECONOMIC LIFE IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 86-88 (1974); JOYCE OLDHAM APPLEBY, ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND
IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 158-64 (1978).
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If the same Goods are bought by Ten Persons one after another,
each of those Ten Persons aims at Gain in passing thro' his hands,.
. yet the Province or Publick is not enrich'd one Farthing by their
Labour... Their meer handing of Goods one to another, no more
increases any Wealth in the Province, than Persons at a Fire
increase the Water in a Pail, by passing it thro' Twenty or Forty
hands."
Actually making something, or exporting something, was an
activity understood to add to the national wealth. Internal trade
was not.
Securities trading fell within this general presumption that internal
trade was not productive. Eighteenth-century critics focused on the same
features of securities Lynn focuses on-they are much easier to buy and
sell repeatedly than anything that had ever been traded before, because
storage costs are negligible, they do not deteriorate, and they cannot be
consumed. For 18th-century critics, however, this ease of circulation
exacerbated a wastefulness that was already present, even in internal trade
in other kinds of goods.
Lynn, of course, lives in a very different climate. The general
assumption within the subculture of late 20th-century economists and law
professors is that internal trade is productive, in the sense that it adds to
national wealth. So Lynn has a much more difficult argument to make.
She cannot argue that the increased velocity of trading associated with
securities merely causes a quantitative difference in social harm-i.e., that
since trading is wasteful, more trading is more wasteful. Instead, she has to
identify a qualitative difference. She has to separate trading into
categories, and argue that some categories are productive and others are
not. So while Lynn is making a very old argument, the argument
necessarily has to include a step that did not need to be made in the 18th
century. While her task is harder in this sense, it is easier in that she has a
much wider array of tools to work with than people did in the 18th
century-portfolio theory, the concept of transaction costs, and so on.
Lynn is thus able to make distinctions that could not have been made
before the 20th century. The core of her argument is three hundred years
old, but changes in the surrounding intellectual environment have forced
18. THE PRESENT MELANCHOLY CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PROVINCE CONSIDER'D, AND
METHODS FOR REDRESS HUMBLY PROPOSED 6-7 (Boston, B. Gray & J. Edwards 1719).
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modifications in the details.
Arguments like Lynn's are as old as securities markets. In the past
three hundred years, they have periodically persuaded governments to
regulate the market so as to restrict trading. Such episodes of regulation
have been closely linked to price declines. If one wants to know what
future event would be most likely to persuade governments that Lynn is
right, the answer is not new developments in information technology. The
answer is a crash.
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